We present a simple dynamic stochastic game between a wage-setting union and a competitive …rm sector which chooses employment. Firms are subject to linear workforce adjustment costs whilst the union, beyond employment and wages, also cares about limiting the number of …red workers during business downturns.
Introduction
The e¤ects of employment protection legislation (Epl) on the performance of labour markets represent an issue highly debated by labour market analysts as well as politicians. The beginning of the interest can be traced back to the …rst half of the '80s when many observers started to blame strict Epl as the main cause for the high European unemployment rate as opposed to that in the United States.
Partial equilibrium analyses, however, did not unveil any causal link between large unemployment and high dismissal costs or strict …ring procedures. Rather, the main insight of models of dynamic labour demand appeared to be that Epl would only reduce workforce turnover with no clear e¤ect on employment levels (Bentolila and Bertola [1990] ).
Workforce stabilisation underscores what is by now a common opinion regarding the main objective of Epl. Namely, reducing the risk of being …red and, when workers are entitled to severance payments, providing an insurance against sharp income reductions following a dismissal . Along this perspective, workers are usually regarded as being risk averse and unable to …nd an insurer due to obvious problems of asymmetric information. On the other hand, analogous di¢culties of conveying objective information to courts also exclude insurance provisions through private arrangements between workers and risk neutral employers. Epl, in summary, is largely regarded as being directed to amend imperfections which prevent risk-sharing through market institutions or private contracts. By restricting the number of workers involved in workforce reductions, employment protection imposes an extra constraint to …rms and hinder their productive e¢ciency but, on the other hand, it also cuts the risk of being …red. Thus, providing it is appropriately designed and administered, employment protection may result in an overall increase in welfare (Bertola [2001] , Pissarides [2001] ).
The most compelling objection against the conclusions of models of dynamic labour demand is represented by aggregate cross-country evidence whereby the risk of being …red -loosely captured by a measure of job turnover -does not appear to be linked to institutional costs of workforce adjustment. In particular, once one ranks OECD countries on the basis of the stringency of Epl, no clear pattern emerges between the position within the rank and average job turnover 1 (OECD [1996] ). Of course, data may not be very reliable whilst conditioning on countryspeci…c composition e¤ects may help to reconcile theory with observations. More fundamentally, however, it may be the case that theory has failed to capture some other aspects of reality that are relevant for turnover decisions. Bertola and Rogerson [1997] provide a …rst avenue to improve the descriptive performance of models.
They notice that countries with loose Epl are also those which present large wage di¤erentials and weak trade unions. By contrast, countries with strict Epl have powerful centralised unions and exhibit narrow wage di¤erentials. Therefore, it may be the case that in countries with weak Epl …rms do not need to …re very much, even if …ring is not very costly, since wages are ‡exible and tend to decrease when business conditions worsen. On the other hand, in countries with strict Epl, …rms would tend to shed labour at high rates since wages hardly adjust to poor business conditions but they refrain from …ring too much due to high institutional costs. Thus, the combination of two institutional features having opposite e¤ect on workforce policy may help to explain the surprising homogeneity of turnover rates across countries face to wide di¤erences in Epl.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the apparent irrelevance of Epl for turnover rates by o¤ering some further perspectives. Our contention is that current models of dynamic labour demand fail to capture an important aspect characterising employment relationships. In particular, as in these models labour is exchanged in a competitive setting, workers are by assumption deprived of any active role in a¤ecting turnover outcomes. Yet, in the real world, employees organise more or less formally in unions and bargain with …rms over many issues, included their retention in case of a worsening in business conditions. In short, it is possible that workers, even in the absence of Epl, do have some ability to reduce the risk of being dismissed by adopting adequate strategies on wages and/or other aspects of the bargained package. Hence, preferences over retention would represent a major 1 Computing rank correlation, on a sample of 10 OECD countries for the second half of the '80s, is quite revealing. The rank correlation coe¢cient (Spearman) between Epl and turnover is unexpectedly positive [½ = 0:1152] but statistically not signi…cant. In short, the ranking on the degree of strictness of Epl is independent from that on average turnover rates. Countries sampled are: USA, Canada, Germany, UK, Italy, France, New Zealand, Finland, Sweden and Denmark (OECD, [1996] ).
determinant of observed turnover rates. Of course, introducing Epl would certainly contribute to the goal of employment stability but its marginal e¤ect would be smaller than one may expect upon the assumption of workers competitive behavior.
In this paper we study a dynamic game where a union sets wages and …rms set employment. The …rm sector is subject to costly workforce adjustments, mainly induced by Epl when workers are …red, and to changes in technology and demand conditions in the form of a stochastic alternance of good and bad business states.
Labour demand is modeled in a rather standard way as it simply generalises the setting of by allowing wages to vary not only over business states but also over time. Labour supply presents instead aspects that may appear novel. In particular, we assume that the union aims at two distinct objectives, the maximisation of rents for those who happen to be employed and their retention in the employment pool over time. In a stable economic environment these two goals would be easy to reach together. But with changing business conditions a con ‡ict emerges in the sense that setting the wage which maximises rents at each point in time generates excessive turnover and deteriorates performance on retention. The optimal strategy of the union is then to sacri…ce some current rents in exchange of more employment stability over the planning horizon. In particular, we …nd that wages are set at a level too low in bad times in order to contain job destruction and at a level too high in good times in order to contain job creation or, more importantly, the number of future dismissals when business conditions will turn bad.
As Epl becomes more severe, …rms are subject to a greater incentive to reduce turnover on their own, i.e. for a given wage policy. From the perspective of the union, this implies a shifting to …rms of some of the burden required to stabilise employment and, more generally, an improvement in the dynamic trade-o¤ between current rents and long term retention. In turn, such a trade-o¤ improvement is exploited by the union through a change in the wage policy in the direction of higher current rents. As a consequence, employment ‡uctuations do not dampen by as much as they would in presence of exogenous (competitive) wages. This may be regarded as the main result of the paper. In short, moderate turnover e¤ects of Epl would arise quite naturally if workers are deeply concerned with their retention and have some power in wage determination.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the …rms-union game is for-malised and solved. Section 3 studies interactions between Epl and the preference for employment stability in a¤ecting turnover rates and wage dynamics. Section 4 discusses assumptions and provides some assessment on the empirical predictions of the model. Section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 A wage-employment game
The setting
We assume that a single union faces a unit mass of identical …rms belonging to the same industry. Firms are competitive and operate with a technology which requires labour as unique input. Their objective is to maximise the present discounted value of a cash ‡ow whose current component cf t is given by the di¤erence between current revenues and labour costs:
The revenue function ¼(® t ; l t ) exhibits the usual property of decreasing marginal productivity:
For any level of labour input, revenues also depend on the economic conditions surrounding the industry (indexed by ® t ), which may change as a consequence of demand and technological shocks. We assume that revenues increase with ® and that ® cycles between two values, ® g in good times and ® b (< ® g ) in bad times. The cycle is stochastic, if business conditions are currently good, the probability of reverting to the bad state in the next period is given by p, of course 1 ¡ p gives the probability that conditions will remain good.
By contrast, if business conditions are currently bad, q represents the probability of reverting to the good state next period whilst 1 ¡ q represents the probability of persisting in the bad state.
In addition to the wage bill w t l t , we assume that …rms support turnover costs in the form of …xed amounts of money that need to be payed for any recruited or dismissed worker. F and H represent individual costs from …ring and hiring whilst f t and h t give the number of workers that are …red and hired at time t.
The union maximises a discounted payo¤ ‡ow with a current component u t resulting from the sum of two terms:
The …rst term is traditional in static union models as it represents rents given by the aggregate number of employed workers L t times the di¤erence between the union wage and some exogenous reference wage (w t ¡ w t ). Since the union is only concerned with sectorial quantities, current business conditions and lagged aggregate employment are su¢cient to describe the state of the game for wage-setting decisions. By contrast, for any single …rm the state of the game also includes its own level of lagged employment.
Employment policy
The aim of this paragraph is to solve the problem faced by a representative …rm by identifying an employment policy of the form l(® j ; l t¡1 ; L t¡1 ) with j = g; b which needs to be optimal for some given wage policy of the form w(® j ; L t¡1 ). For ease of exposition, however, instead of focusing directly on employment we derive, as a …rst step, optimal hiring and …ring policies 2 :
Assumptions on the dynamics of business conditions and reference wages describe a stochastic but time-stationary environment for both types of agents. This leads quite naturally to represent the problem faced by …rms with the following couple of Bellman equation where current …ring, hiring and employment are indicated by the
The value of a single …rm depends on current business conditions, lagged own employment and, since it a¤ects current wages, lagged aggregate employment. In particular, the value is given by the current cash- ‡ow plus the expected discounted continuation value.
Due to the linearity of adjustment costs -and for a given wage policy -a solution to above equations does not feature in general positive workforce changes following variations in business conditions. Inaction, in fact, may be a solution when adjustment costs are particularly high to overtake returns from workforce variations. In the real world, however, sectorial employment expands and contracts as a result of demand and productivity changes so that positive adjustments appear to be the case empirically relevant. Thus, in the following we focus on an equilibrium which exhibits positive hiring after a reversion from the bad to the good state and positive …ring in the opposite case. Later in the section, we examine conditions which guarantee positive workforce adjustments in equilibrium More formally, since workers are homogeneous, we guess that in equilibrium …rms never …re in good times nor hire in bad times:
. And we also guess that …ring and hiring take place at positive rates at some point during a bad and a good spell. That is, we guess that the last two inequalities hold strictly in at least one period within a spell of permanently good or bad business conditions.
Let us de…ne
) as the net shadow value of an extra hired worker, i.e. the derivative with respect to h 0 g of the present discounted value of cash ‡ows conditional on business conditions being good:
Thus, the net shadow value of hiring increases with current marginal productivity and with the next period discounted shadow value of an extra hired worker and decreases with current wages and hiring costs. Taking account of the non-negative constraint h 0 g¸0 , optimality requires
In words, if the …rm hires at a positive rate, then the net shadow value must be zero. On the other hand, the …rm does not hire if the net shadow value is negative.
Analogously, de…ne D f (l 
This has an interpretation similar to D h (l 0 g ). Again, taking account of the nonnegative constraint f 0 b¸0 , we have
Finally, from the Belmanns we may compute derivatives of continuation values with respect to current employment:
and
Lemma 1: If D f (:) = 0 holds at all times during a bad spell and if D g (:) = 0 holds at all times during a good spell, then dD f (l
to hold is su¢cient that derivatives of continuation values with respect to l 
These are mere extensions of equations derived by . Four points deserve attention. First, since …rms are small with respect to the market, they take wages as given and do not attempt to use the employment policy to in ‡uence wage determination. Second, …ring costs increase labour demand in bad times and decrease labour demand in good times. The …rst e¤ect is rather obvious, if …ring becomes more costly, …rms will …re less in bad times and employment will be higher.
The second is more subtle; if …ring costs increase …rms become more reluctant to hire since more hirings imply more future …rings -and higher …ring expenses -when business conditions will turn bad. An analogous explanation hold for the e¤ect of hiring costs. Third, even if in principle employment is made contingent on its lagged value, this does not turn to be the case in the actual policy. The explanation lies in the linearity of adjustment costs with respect to the number of …red and hired workers. Were costs quadratic, for instance, we would observe smoothing, that is dependence on past values. Fourth, aggregate lagged employment a¤ect current employment at the …rm level only through wages.
The last two remarks imply that, from the point of view of the union, current labour demand depends only on the current state of technology and on the current wage. Thus, upon aggregation, we have:
Wage policy
We derive the policy of the union under a linear speci…cation for the marginal revenue function:
Substitution in 5 and 6 gives the following demand functions:
Again, we indicate current decision variable with w
Where demand functions L(j; w 0 j ) are given by equations 7 and 8. Using the envelope theorem for derivatives involving continuation values, we obtain the following f.o.c. for w 0 g :
The latter, together with labor demand equations L(g; w ). Notice, however, that lagged employment L t¡1 is absent both in 9 and in labour demands so that, during good business conditions, the wage and employment levels turn out to be una¤ected by past employment:
). In particular, we …nd
where e w g´1 2
H ¤ represents the wage that the union would set in the absence of …ring aversion [°= 0]. Thus, being averse to …ring plays a role in good times too, when …ring does not actually take place. Unions, in fact, behave in a forward looking fashion and add to the wage in good times an extra amount which re ‡ects the concern of containing the number of workforce additions in order to contain the number of dismissals when business condition will worsen.
Equation 10 makes clear that such a wage correction increases with the probability of reverting to the bad state and with the parameter which captures aversion to …rings and decreases with the interest rate as future events are discounted at a higher rate. 
Let B 1 and B 2 -with B 1 >B 2 -be the two roots. Since they are both negative, w 0 b is a decreasing function of lagged employment and, if business conditions remain bad, an increasing function of the lagged wage rate. More precisely, conditional of persistently bad business conditions, current wages depend on past wages through a multiplier given by ¡Bb. Thus, for convergence, we rule out B 2 and choose B 1 as the latter turns out to be the only root with an absolute value lower than 1=b.
The corresponding solution for the other undetermined coe¢cient is
H ¤ represents the wage that the union would set in bad times in the absence of …ring aversion. As a consequence, the wage function takes a rather intuitive form:
which implies the following sequence of employment levels within a spell of low productivity:
At any time during the spell the di¤erence between current employment and L(b; e w b ), the level of employment which would arise without …ring aversion, is a fraction of its lagged value so that L(b; e w b ) also represents the steady state. Furthermore, employment converges to the steady state from above since the sequence starts with the positive value L g ¡ L(b; e w b ). Intuitively, since …ring aversion increases at the margin, from the point of view of the union optimality requires dismissals to be spread over time instead of being concentrated in only one period. Thus, to induce small per-period workforce dismissals, the union undercuts the steady state level e w b in the …rst period of a bad spell and moves gradually upwards in the directions of the steady state as bad conditions persist.
The degree of stickiness in the dynamics of employment and the measure of wage undercutting [for a given di¤erence L g ¡ L(b; e w b )] are both indexed by ¡B 1 , which is an increasing function of°. Thus, stickiness and wage undercutting increase if large workforce reductions become more costly to the union.
Equilibrium
We have computed optimal union wages given the employment policy of …rms as summarised by equations 7 and 8. However, the latter are optimal only if wages do not increase during a spell of high productivity and do not decrease during a spell of low productivity and if the equilibrium displays positive workforce adjust- Inserting L g as lagged employment in equations 12 and 13 we obtain an expres-
This can be coupled with labour demand equations 7 and 8 and with the condition 10 to obtain a system of four equations with four unknowns (w g , w b , L g and
Thus, conditional on small cyclical variations in reference wages -i.e. a small di¤erence w g ¡ w b -in equilibrium …rms hire and …re at positive rates if adjustment costs are not too high with respect to the change in productivity. Further, for given costs and productivity parameters, positive adjustments become more likely if state transition probabilities decrease. Intuitively, incentives to hire and …re increase if changes in business conditions tend to last for longer times.
The condition for positive workforce adjustments also guarantees that equilibrium wages move pro-cyclically.
The cyclical behaviour of employment and wages
The aim of this section is to characterise the interaction between workforce adjustment costs and the union preference over employment retention in a¤ecting the cyclical behavior of employment and wages. For this purpose we assign a set of values 3 to structural parameters and provide a graphical representation for the solution of the system composed by equations 7, 8, 10 and 14 under di¤erent values of F , H
and°. To present results in compact form, we also assign …ring and hiring costs as …xed proportions of a general measure of adjustment costs. In the attempt to catch some aspects of the real world we allow …ring costs to be the dominant component: We …rst observe how the slope of the line corresponding to°= 0 in …g. 1a
suggests that, in the absence of …ring aversion, adjustment costs are particularly e¤ective in reducing turnover. This …nding is rather intuitive and, in fact, represents a major result within the theory of dynamic labour demand. Much less intuitive, instead, is the e¤ect of adjustment costs on wage ‡uctuations. Figure 1a illustrates how, even without …ring aversion, ‡uctuations dampen if costs increase. In line with , however, we argue that the negative relationship between wage changes and adjustment costs is spurious as it depends on the particular functional forms that have been adopted.
One can easily show, in fact, that with the linear schedules 7 and 8 the elasticity of labour demand increases with adjustment costs when …rms hire and decreases when they hire. Thus, monopolistic union wages tend to decrease with adjustment 4 The rate of turnover is computed as follows:
. This is obviously a shortcut. Since p = q, it is true that …rms spend half of their time in each state. Nevertheless, employment in the bad state decreases with time so that using the constant L b implies overstating average employment and understating turnover.
Using "correct" values for the average turnover rate, however, entails only very minor changes in turnover results. This explains why we decided to present the solution in a form which is slighly imprecise but simple.
costs in good times and to increase in bad times. But this is far to be general. If one uses a Cobb-Douglas speci…cation for ¼(® t ; l t ), for instance, adjustment costs a¤ect labour demand elasticity in a fashion which is simply the opposite of what happens in the linear case (see below).
If°increases, …gure 1a indicates that employment turnover decreases proportionally for any regime of workforce adjustment costs. Or, from a reversed perspective, that adjustment costs become less relevant as a determinant of workers turnover.
On the other hand, wage changes following reversions in business conditions increase proportionally. Again, from a reversed point of view, this implies that adjustment costs become more relevant in determining wage ‡uctuations if aversion to …ring is higher.
Intuitively, for given adjustment costs, unions choose the best point along a dynamic trade-o¤ whereby small employment ‡uctuations are paid in terms of excessive wage ‡uctuations. If adjustment costs increase, the trade-o¤ becomes more favorable, for …rms tend to stabilise employment on their own. Unions, in turn, use these more favourable terms to adopt a wage policy featuring less variability. Of course, the strength of these e¤ects depends on union preferences over the con ‡icting objectives represented by wage optimal variability and employment stability. As°i ncreases such a con ‡ict becomes more compelling and a given trade-o¤ improvement leads to a large reduction in wage ‡uctuations. By contrast, if°decreases, the same trade-o¤ improvement generates a smaller reduction in wage ‡uctuations.
This explains why the relationship between wage changes and adjustment costs becomes steeper as°increases whilst the relationship between employment changes and adjustment costs becomes ‡atter.
Cobb Douglas Technology
Here we intend to provide some assessment on the robustness of above conclusions by checking whether they hold under a di¤erent speci…cation for the marginal productivity of labour. Thus, in the following, we move from the linear to a log-linear form:
Unfortunately, with the new function the model loses the linear-quadratic structure and tractability deteriorates. A simple solution, however, is still available if ones restricts the wage policy to depend uniquely upon the state of productivity 5 . Therefore, in the remainder of the section the vector [w g , w b , L g ,L b ] represents the full solution instead of a simpli…ed characterisation.
The new labour demand schedules are obtained by substituting 17 in 5 and 6.
Wage rates, instead, are given by the values w g and w b which maximise discounted union payo¤ ‡ows in good and bad business conditions, W g and W b :
These hardly require any comment as their nature of asset evaluation equations is rather clear. We only remark that the discounted value in the …rst period of a bad spell W b must be distinct from that of the following periods f W b . For, since the wage has been restricted to be the same all over the spell, …rings take place only in the …rst period and do not a¤ect the payo¤ of later periods. As …ring aversion increases, cyclical wage ‡uctuations may become constant with respect to adjustment costs. This happens because the spurious elasticity e¤ect is exactly counteracted by the incentive to stabilise employment. Of course, for a su¢ciently high aversion, employment stabilisation becomes a major concern and the link may turn negative.
In summary, inserting a CD technology in the model proves inconsequential for the above analysis on the determinants of turnover rates. On the other hand, it also warns against the temptation of making any conclusion on the link between turnover costs and wage dynamics.
Discussion and Empirical Predictions
Overall, the analysis suggests that …ring and hiring costs may not be so relevant in determining labour turnover since the underlying quest for more employment stability can be partly satis…ed through union policies leading to more cyclical wages.
This may help to explain the stylised fact whereby economies with much di¤erent regimes of employment protection exhibit quite similar turnover patterns.
With competitive wages, theoretical predictions are sharply at odds with facts 7 The argument made in Bertola and Rogerson (1997) , and reviewed in the introduction of the present paper, is appealing. It may contribute to explain evidence from the 6 countries sample considered by the authors, the Anglo-Saxon block (U.S.A., U.K. and Canada) and the Continental Europe block (France, Italy and Germany). Some problems arise, however, if the argument is applied within the European borders. In particular, the sample made by France, Italy, Germany, Finland, Sweden and Denmark exhibits no correlation between turnover rates and Epl strictness but positive (and signi…cant) rank correlation between the latter and earnings dispersion (OECD By contrast, if one allows for uncompetitive wage-setting and …ring aversion on the part of those who shape the policy of the union, the link between turnover and costs weakens considerably and may well escape detection in data analysis. Thus, the main concern of this section is to provide some assessment on these relevant assumptions by contrasting our setting with other related papers. Later in the section we also devote some attention to the empirical consistence of those predictions of the model that are peripheral with respect to the relationship between Epl and turnover.
In retrospect, the framework used in this paper may be regarded as a combination of a labour demand setting à la Bertola and a dynamic union monopoly model of the kind used by Kennan [1988] or, more recently, Modesto and Thomas [2001] .
The main di¤erence with these papers relates to the assumption on the preference for workforce stabilisation in addition to the usual objective represented by some functional combination of employment and wages. This is obtained by summing to a traditional utilitarian function (Oswald [1985] ) a quadratic term of the kind frequently used in the hysteresis literature Summers [1986], Manning [1988] ). With the following important change. While in this literature any di¤erence between current employment and membership (i.e. lagged employment) is assumed to be costly to the union, no matter whether it is positive due to new hirings or negative due to …rings, in the present paper we only allow for costly workforce reductions 8 . More formally, union indi¤erence curves in the wage-employment space are asymmetric with respect to the locus where current and lagged employment are equal. Akin to Carruth and Oswald [1987] , curves ‡atten in a discontinuous fashion when employment overtakes its lagged level. Nevertheless, it is true that unions also oppose workforce expansions by setting very high wages in good times, but this sort of "hiring aversion" is not imposed from the beginning. Rather, it arises endogenously from the assumption of a two state stochastic cycle coupled with [1996] ). 8 The union objective function in Summers [1986, 1987] and Manning [1988] is U = ¡(n ¡ m) 2 where n represents current employment and m current membership, which, according to the insider-outsider mechanism, represents some function of lagged employment n ¡1 .
An obvious criticism against this formulations concerns its symmetry so that employment above membership turns out to reduce welfare (Sanfey [1995] ). In our setting, symmetry is excluded as the hysteresis component is absent when n > m and shows up under the heading of "…ring aversion" only when n < m.
forward looking behaviour on the part of the union.
If Epl is directed to provide employment insurance, it seems quite natural to introduce some preference for employment retention. Casual observation does in fact suggest that unions use their political in ‡uence to maintain and enhance protection.
Yet, Modesto and Thomas (2001) provide an argument whereby unions bene…t from adjustment costs even in the absence of …ring aversion. This happens because, in their framework, workforce adjustment costs are quadratic so that current employment depends on its lagged value. This reduces labour demand elasticity along the adjustment path to a new equilibrium level of employment and, implicitly, enhances monopolistic power in wage-setting. One should notice, however, that empirical investigation on …rms data has rejected a quadratic speci…cation of costs 9 . Second, Modesto and Thomas also assume symmetric costs with the consequence that the union, since it is concerned with the welfare of insiders as well as outsiders, bene…ts from sluggish adjustments when …rms move to lower levels of employment following negative shocks but su¤er when adjustments are directed to increase employment in the aftermath of a positive shock. In sum, unions should press for higher adjustment costs only if they expect perturbations to be usually negative 10 .
Apart from weakening the link between Epl and turnover, we ask whether the model is consistent with available evidence along other dimensions. A …rst relevant issue appears to be link between Epl and wage ‡uctuations. In this respect, however, the model, does not predict any speci…c pattern. On one hand, since employment stability is obtained at the cost of wider wage ‡uctuations, stricter Epl leads to narrower ‡uctuations. On the other hand, stricter Epl may a¤ect labour demand elasticity in a way that ‡uctuations enlarge. As wage changes a¤ect individuals income pro…les, a rough indications on the elasticity of wages to business conditions may by grasped from data on individual earnings mobility. In this respect, we notice that, although the Anglo-Saxon countries presents higher earnings dispersion in comparison to the (continental) European countries, when it comes to earnings 9 See Hamermesh (1989) and Caballero et al. (1997) , for instance. 10 Unions could desire substantial adjustment costs in the transition to higher employment only if concern over the welfare of outsiders is negligeable. In fact, in our model the union bene…ts from an higher hiring cost H since, in this case, retention increases for given wages. Lindbeck and Snower [1988] come to similar conclusions when they note that insiders may even behave strategically -by refusing to cooperate with newly hired workers, for instance -in order to increase H. mobility the picture is surprisingly much more homogeneous 11 (OCSE[1996] ). This accords with the model once one accept the CD speci…cation as being the most descriptive and assumes that the preference over retention leads to a fairly horizontal line in picture 2b.
Probably, a better avenue to check empirical consistency is to look at more disaggregated evidence on the e¤ect of unionisation on turnover. The issue has not been addressed by many studies. Lucifora (1998) , however, provides some interesting results by showing how the presence of local unions reduces job turnover in the Italian metal-mechanical sector. We note that this industry …ts rather closely our framework as a centralised union dominates sectorial country-level bargaining while second stage …rm-level bargaining a¤ords substantial degrees of freedom in adapting country-level agreements to idiosyncratic contingencies. Hence, as assumed, …rms do not act strategically on employment to in ‡uence wage decisions while the concern for retention may well operate at the second stage.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented a stochastic dynamic framework where wages are decided by a (monopolistic) union and employment by a perfectly competitive …rm sector. Firms are subject to linear adjustment costs whilst the union, apart from employment and wages, also cares for retention of those who happen to be employed. The main result of the model is that adjustment costs do a¤ect job turnover rates but the link may be very weak and, in any case, weaker than may be expected on the basis of exogenous (competitive) wages. In this sense, Epl would merely act as a device to make it easier for the union to reach the goal of employment stabilisation.
Although others have argued on the irrelevance of Epl and on its stance to operate a redistribution in favour of those who are employed (Saint-Paul [1996] ),
we would like to warn against any temptation to draw simple policy indications.
Several caveats need to be considered. Above all, one should bear in mind that 11 "..While the United States has substantially more inequality than other OECD countries, it is not an outlier when it comes to mobility.....Likewise, the more centralised wage setting institutions in Germany and the Nordic countries do not translate into signi…cantly less mobility in those countries than in the United States..." (Gottschalk [1997] , p.38).
in many developed economies a substantial fraction of workers, especially at the lower end of the income distribution, present low rates of union density. Of course, our argument loses momentum in a non-unionised contexts where strict Epl may well lead to a welfare improving reduction in the risk of being dismissed. Second, Epl may turn out to have positive welfare e¤ects also through mechanisms that are completely disregarded in models of dynamic labour demand. For instance, Epl may provide …rms with a commitment technology capable to overcome the lack of credibility when they announce -in good times -to retain workers also during bad times. In the absence of Epl, in fact, workers would anticipate incentives to renege on promises of retention and, due to the higher …ring probability, may withdraw productive e¤ort unless particularly high e¢ciency wages are paid. Thus, strict Epl may lead to lower e¢ciency wages and higher employment (Fella [2000] ).
